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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-INTANGIBLES ESCHEATABLE ONLY AT
CREDITOR'S LAST-KNOWN ADDRESS.In an original action before

the United States Supreme Court, four states, Texas, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and Florida, claimed the right to escheat certain
intangible property. The property consisted of unclaimed debts,
such as uncashed dividend and wage checks, owed by the Sun Oil
Company to many small creditors. Emphasizing considerations of
administrative practicality and the respective equities of the claimants, the Court held that the most reasonable approach was to
permit only the state of the creditor's last-known address to
appropriate the monies. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674
(1965).
Modern escheat statutes broadly provide for the state to take
into its control ownerless property abandoned within the state.'
The American statutes generally do not distinguish between real
and personal property. Rather, they proceed on the common-law
theory of bona vacantia, i.e., the state is the most proper owner
of otherwise unclaimed property in its territory. 2 The states, in
the face of rising costs of government, have eagerly sought to tap
this source of revenue. However, a state can only properly
claim property abandoned within its territory.3 Since intangible
property has aspects of location both with the creditor and the
debtor, inevitably conflicts arose when several states sought to
escheat the same intangibles. This difficulty was aggravated by
the piecemeal approach adopted by the Supreme Court. For
example, when dealing with corporate debts similar to the ones
in the instant case, the Court held that the state of incorporation

' See generally McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes, and
the Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus. LAW. 1062 (1959); Note, Origins and
Development of Modern Escheat, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1319 (1961).
2 See statutes cited in Note, supra note 1, at 1327 n.25. Escheat statutes
are basically of two types: true escheat statutes, which vest title in the
claiming state, usually after a specified period; and the custodial type of
statute, adopted by the greater number of jurisdictions, which provides that
the actual owner or his heirs can recover the property from the state at
any time. McBride, supra note 1, at 1063-64. Today, the trend appears to
be toward the custodial type because it serves the dual purpose of protecting
the interests of the true owners and causing otherwise unclaimed assets to
be used for the general welfare. Lake, Escheat, Federalism and State
Boundaries, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 322, 325 (1963).
3 See Note, supra note 1, at 1320.
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of the debtor could escheat the unclaimed debts.4 On the other
band, in the case of Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,5
the Supreme Court permitted New York to escheat abandoned
insurance proceeds on the bases of the insured's residence and
the delivery of the insurance policy within New York. Refusing to consider potential multistate claims, the Court, in these
cases, emphasized jurisdictional concepts, i.e., the escheating state's
physical power over the debtor in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey,6
and its sufficient contacts with the transactions in Moore.7 Thus,
as the dissenters contend in the instant case, two separate states
could escheat the same intangible property.8 Yet, case law dictates
that only one state has the constitutional right to escheat any given
property.9
As increasing numbers of states sought escheat revenues,
multiple claims against holders of abandoned intangibles posed
intricate problems. 10 Faced with differing determinations by state
courts concerning control of intangibles, the Court acknowledged
the necessity for authoritatively determining this issue.'1
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court followed an ad hoc approach
to intangible property, never finally determining its situs, but
locating it in different places for different purposes. For example,
the case of Harris v. Balk 12 established that intangibles may be
garnished whenever personal jurisdiction may be acquired over
a debtor-garnishee who does not contest the validity of the debt.
This judicial action on a debt is not dependent on its situs, but
rather is an adjudication of the garnishee's personal obligations.
Since the garnishee1 3 is actually before the court, the situs of the
debt is immaterial.
The Court has likewise been troubled by the intangible's situs
when determining a state's jurisdiction to tax. Rejecting
precedent, the Supreme Court has held that intangibles have situs
solely at their creditor's domicile, and therefore, an inheritance
tax could be levied only by that state.14 However, this rule was
4

Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); cf. Security

Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
5333 U.S. 541 (1948).
,BStandard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, Supra note 4, at 439-40.
87 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).

Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, supra note 4, at 444 (dissenting

opinion); Connecticut Mut Life. Ins. Co. v. Moore, supra note 7, at 552
(dissenting opinion).
9 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, supra note 4, at 443.
10 See McBride, supra note 1, at 1071-73.

See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 77-79

(1961).
12

198 U.S. 215 (1905).

Id. at 222-23.

14 See Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930),
overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
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of short duration. In the case of State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich,15
the Court returned to the proposition that the state's right to
tax is founded on its power over the object taxed. This power
may be predicated upon dominion over tangibles or persons whose
relationships are the source of intangible rights, upon the benefit
and protection of laws conferred by the taxing sovereignty, or
upon both.'
The Court also rejected any due process immunity
from double taxation, substituting the requirement that the
state
7
give "something" for which it can exact a tax in return.'

With

intangible property, the "something" each state gives is the protection of its laws which makes the debt enforceable."" Therefore,
besides the state of the creditor's domicile, there is also jurisdiction
to tax intangibles in the state where the debtor is domiciled, and
any other state which affords the debt the protection of its laws.' 9
Thus, the Supreme Court had, prior to the instant case, pursued
an ambivalent policy with respect to the escheat of intangibles
while constantly expanding the bases of the state's jurisdiction
to tax intangibles.
The controversy in the instant case concerned the right to
escheat certain abandoned property in the form of many small
debts. Because the last-known addresses of a great majority
of the creditors, as well as the books evidencing the debts, were
in Texas, that state brought the action against New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Sun Oil. New Jersey claimed that, as the state
of Sun Oil's incorporation, it alone had the right to escheat.
Pennsylvania based its right on the location of Sun Oil's principal
place of business in that state, and Florida intervened, claiming
the right to escheat that portion of Sun Oil's obligations owed
to persons whose last-known addresses were in Florida.
The Court rejected Texas' claim that the state with the most
significant contacts with-the debts should have exclusive jurisdiction
to escheat the property in its entirety. It was noted that this
test would promote litigation between states, since any state
might allege that it had the closest contacts. Then, the majority
rejected New Jersey's contention that the state of domicile of the
debtor should be the sole escheator since they considered this
factor to be of minor significance. The claim of Pennsylvania
that it was the principal place of Sun Oil's business, and hence,
gave the benefits of its economy and laws to the company, was
considered to be of greater merit. However, because of the difficult
question of determining the location of a company's principal place
15316 U.S. 174 (1942).
16 Id. at 178, quoting Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1939).
1".Id at 180, 183.
IsBlackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 205 (1903).
CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 78-97 (4th ed. 1964),
'9 See generally GOODRICH,
for treatment of simple choses in action, bonds, bank deposits, corporate
stock and inheritance tax.
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of business, and because the debts owed by Sun Oil were not its
property, but its liability, Pennsylvania's claim failed. The Court
adopted the rule suggested by Florida, that since the debt is an
asset of the creditor, the right and power to escheat "should be
accorded to the state of the creditor's last known address as shown
by the debtor's books and records." 20 It was considered "funda'2
mentally a question of ease of administration and of equity." '
Because the standard is the creditor's last-known address rather
than his residence or domicile, administration of escheat laws will
be simplified. In addition, the Court reasoned that since the debt
is the creditor's property, the rule adopted tends to distribute
escheats equitably among the states in proportion to the commercial activity of their residents. Furthermore, the Court proffered
two circumstances in which the principle espoused by the instant
case would be inapplicable. Whenever the state of last-known
address has not enacted an escheat procedure or when there is no
record of any address, it was decided that the state of the debtor's
domicile should appropriate the property. Under these circumstances, the state could retain the monies for its own benefit, but
only until some other state could show a superior right to
escheat.
The significant result of the instant case will be to sharply
restrict the application of the broadly worded escheat statutes
enacted by various states. For example, the Pennsylvania statute
in the instant case provides:
after any particular deposit of money, made with every person, co-partner-

ship . . . and corporation . . . shall not have been increased or decreased or
•.. shall not be known to have been credited with interest, on the passbook or
certificate of deposit of the depositor at his request, for the period of ...
[listing different types of deposits] the same shall be escheatable to the
22
Commonwealth.
Under this type of statute, no relevance is given to the state's
relation to the creditor, but the emphasis is entirely on the state's
control over the debtor. On the other hand, under the doctrine
of the principal case the right to escheat exists only where the
creditor maintained his last-known address. Hence, in the future
all the statutes must be conformed, either by interpretation or
administration, to the last-known address rule.
The strength of this holding is in its final determination of
the problem of multiple escheat. The rule adopted appears to be
the best of the available ones. Hereafter, banks, for instance,
20

21
22

Texas v. New Jersey, 85 Sup. Ct 626, 630 (1965).
Id. at 631.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 282 (1958). See also N.Y. ABAND. PRop. LAW
§§ 300, 400, 510, 600, 1000, 1200. But see N.Y. ABAND. PRop. LAW §§ 501,

700.
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will be able to pay escheat claims without fear of dual liability.
Furthermore, escheat revenues, by this rule, will be apportioned
ratably among the various states according to the commercial
activity of their residents. Finally, by adopting both an equitable
and practical test, the Court has saved itself from a potential
flood of original-jurisdiction suits to determine questions of
fact.
However, the narrowly defined power of the states to escheat
intangibles must be juxtaposed against the expansion of state power
to tax intangible property. As indicated previously, any state offering benefit or protection to property could tax it. More precisely, taxation within constitutional limitations, could feasibly subvert the intent
of the "last-known address" doctrine. For example, a corporation
domiciled in State A owes monies to several creditors whose lastknown addresses are in State B. State B, pursuant to the Texas
case, statutorily escheats the monies. State A could, because the
power of its laws makes the debt enforceable, impose a substantial
tax on the right to escheat that property. Thus, State A would
effectively deprive State B of the possible escheat revenue. Such
a tax appears permissible under the wide latitude of tax jurisdiction
afforded by the Supreme Court.
This hypothetical brings into sharp focus the tendencies inherent
in the Court's treatment of intangible property in the areas of
taxation and escheat. It also seems to necessitate the development
of a unifying principle for multistate taxation of intangible property.
The Supreme Court was able. in the laboratory conditions of a
case of first impression, to adopt both a practical and equitable
principle. However. by doing so. the Court has solved but one
of a great many complex and interdependent problems.

V
CRIMINAL LAW - KIDNAPINGDETENTION INCIDENTAL TO
CRIME OF ROBBERY HELD NOT KIDNAPING.In a recent criminal

prosecution the jury found that the defendants forced their way
into the complainants' car, and while one of them drove the car,
the other appropriated complainants' jewelry and case. The trip
covered twenty-seven city blocks and took twenty minutes. The
defendants were convicted of kidnaping, in addition to robbery
and criminal possession of a pistol. In reversing the conviction
on the kidnaping count, the Court of Appeals held that the crime
committed was essentially robbery, reasoning that the restraint
imposed upon the complainants was merely incidental to the commission of that crime and did not constitute the separate crime
of kidnaping. People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1965).

